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Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity
Andrea M. Matwyshyn*
Traditional paradigms of technology regulation ask how
technology-mediated space 1 is different from non-technology
mediated space. Regulation rarely focuses on how technology
makes a user develop differently than she/he otherwise would
and what those differences might mean for regulatory
approaches. Yet, this is perhaps the most important inquiry
regulators should undertake as they grapple with crafting law
that guides future generations of technology developers and
users.
Human development 2 -centered legislative analyses of new
technologies may be rare because a flawed assumption is
widely held in the law regarding the nature of human
development. Human development has traditionally been
conceptualized as a linear proposition—a steady upward
trajectory with expected outcomes based on age. We use bright
line age restrictions in many contexts, for example, presuming
adults are more developed than children. 3
© 2007 Andrea M. Matwyshyn.
* Andrea M. Matwyshyn is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business
Ethics at the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania. Her research
focuses on innovation policy, specifically the legal, social, and business
implications of information technology and data security. In addition to her
appointment at University of Pennsylvania, she is an Affiliate of the Centre
for Economics & Policy in the Institute for Manufacturing at the University of
Cambridge. She invites comment at amatwysh@wharton.upenn.edu.
1. When I speak of technology-mediated space, I mean the totality of all
human exchanges that rely on technology to facilitate them in material part.
For example, all exchanges through the Internet are “technology mediated”, as
are automated teller withdrawals, airport check-in procedures, and credit card
transactions in real space.
2. See, e.g., Biology Online, available at http://www.biologyonline.org/dictionary/Human_development (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) (human
development is “continuous sequential changes which occur in the
physiological and psychological functions during the individuals [sic] life”).
3. For example, only people aged eighteen or over are typically allowed
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The premise for this approach is founded in the traditional
developmental psychology theory of Jean Piaget 4 and his
progeny. However, more recent theories of developmental
psychology point out the flaws in reliance on linear paradigms. 5
The major shortcoming of the linear approach is its failure to
acknowledge the role that the environment and cultural tools, 6
such as technology, play in development.
Variations in
developmental context result in fundamentally different
developmental outcomes. 7 This variation presents a critical
question for the future of technology regulation. By changing
the technology tools of an environment, users’ development is
fundamentally altered, and regulation focused on a particular
technology tool becomes obsolete. 8 These dynamics are better
to vote in political elections in the United States.
4. Key works of Jean Piaget include B. INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE
EARLY GROWTH OF LOGIC IN THE CHILD: CLASSIFICATION AND SERIATION (E.
A. Lunzer & D. Papert, trans., W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1964); BÄRBEL
INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD
TO ADOLESCENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL
STRUCTURES (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgram, trans., Basic Books, Inc.
1958); J. PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE (Beatrix Walsh, trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1971) (1967); J. PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER
(C. Gattegno & F. M. Hodgson, trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1952)
(1941); JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (1928); J.
PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1955); JEAN PIAGET,
INTRODUCTION A L’ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE GÉNÉTIQUE: TOMES 1-3 (Presses
Universitaires de France, 1950); J. PIAGET, LOGIQUE ET CONNAISSANCE
SCIENTIFIQUE (1967); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
(Marjorie Gabain, trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932); J.
PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (Margaret Cook, trans.,
Int’l Univ. Press, Inc. 1953) (1936); J. PIAGET, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (Leslie
Smith, ed., Terrance Brown et al., trans., Routledge 1995) (1965); J. PIAGET,
STUDIES IN REFLECTING ABSTRACTION (Robert L. Campbell, ed. & trans.,
Psychology Press 2001) (1977) [hereinafter PIAGET, REFLECTING
ABSTRACTION].
5. See, e.g., LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962).
6. The term “cultural tool” is loosely defined as a tool which permits an
individual to accomplish more than she/he otherwise could and arose out of
the work of developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky. For a discussion of
cultural tools, see James V. Wertsch & Peeter Tulviste, L. S. Vygotsky and
Contemporary Developmental Psychology, in AN INTRODUCTION TO VYGOTSKY
SECOND EDITION 59, 67 (Harry Daniels ed. 2d ed., 2005)
7. For example, a teenager with a laptop and an email account living in
Minneapolis can befriend a person living in Ghana and learn information
about life in Ghana otherwise unavailable to this teen. The cumulative
learning arising out of these technology facilitated experiences alter the
developmental process of this Minneapolis teenager.
8. For example, the Controlling the Assault of Nonsolicited Pornography
and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM Act) fell prey to this flawed assumption.

MATWYSHYN A. Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
2007;8(2):515-549.

2007]

TECH., COMMERCE, DEVELOPMENT, IDENTITY

517

addressed by nonlinear developmental psychology than by
traditional linear paradigms.
This article introduces nonlinear developmental paradigms
of contextualist and ecological developmental psychology theory
to the debate over technology regulation. It argues that
technology regulation presents a strong example of the dangers
and inefficiencies of blindly adopting an approach to regulating
human conduct based solely on linear developmental
assumptions.
This article specifically explores the legal
implications of technology-mediated human development using
the technology policy arena of corporate child data security
contracting regulation.
Section I introduces the major debates in current legal
literature regarding technology regulation and describes the
role of linear developmental assumptions in certain existing
regulatory paradigms. Section II presents an introduction to
nonlinear developmental psychology theory, contrasts it to
linear theory, and describes the pivotal role that technology
tools play in developmental outcomes. Section III uses the
example of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) 9 and the corporate child data protection contracting
obligations thereunder to illustrate the practical shortcomings
of always presuming developmental linearity in regulatory
paradigms. Section IV argues that technology regulation
should first and foremost be understood as the regulation of
human development; it usually requires a nonlinear
developmental paradigm as its starting point. Only regulation
which adopts a focus on user behaviors in social context can
succeed; regulation focusing on technology creation, on the
Controlling the Assault of Nonsoliticed pronography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
7701-7713 and 18 U.S.C. § 1037). The definition of the types of technology
communications regulated by the CAN SPAM Act are limited to email
communications and do not consider the same regulatory concerns posed by,
for example, unsolicited instant messaging communications. As such, the
legislation has limited efficacy because the technology used for the
communications adapts to accommodate the existence of a technology specific
regulatory paradigm. Developers of code simply generated work around
solutions for the content and users continue to receive unwanted technology
mediated communications. For a discussion of definitional shortcomings of
“spam” under the CAN SPAM Act and technology adaptation see, e.g., Andrea
M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an International
Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 4 (2006); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Spam and
Security: Recognizing the Connection and Assessing Legal Strategy After the
CAN-SPAM Act, 5 ILB 307 (March 2004).
9. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1651-6506
(2000).
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other hand, will not. Our regulatory paradigms must be
sensitive to these emergent 10 human development dynamics.
I. TRADITIONAL REGULATION PARADIGMS FOR
TECHNOLOGY-MEDIATED COMMERCE: IS TECHNOLOGY
SPECIAL?
Society has undergone an economic and cultural shift
driven by technology. 11 Both industry pundits 12 and the U.S
Department of Commerce assert that the “new economy” is not
a myth and that a fundamental, information technology-driven
change has occurred. 13 In a 2002 report, the Department of
Commerce 14 indicated that despite the recession within the
10. Emergence is order that arises from the interactions of individual
actors within a complex system, demonstrating a global pattern that could not
have been forecast simply from understanding the behavior of one particular
actor. See STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS,
BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE 18 (Scribner 2001).
11. Lee Price & George McKittrick, Setting the Stage: The “New Economy”
Endures Despite Reduced IT Investment, in DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002 1, 5 (U.S.
Dep’t
of
Commerce
2002),
available
at
https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf.
12. See, e.g., ASPEN INSTITUTE, WHEN PUSH COMES TO PULL: THE NEW
ECONOMY AND CULTURE OF NETWORKING TECHNOLOGY (2006), available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/2005InfoTechText.pdf
13. See Price & McKittrick, supra note 11, at 5 (“The central feature of the
[technology-driven] ‘new economy’ has been a higher growth rate of
productivity, which in turn has brought faster gains in our standards of
living.”).
14. David Henry & Donald Dalton, Information Technology Industries in
the New Economy, in DIGITAL ECON. 2002 23, 23-24 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce
2002), available at https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf.
The
information technology industry is credited with 29% of the United States’
economy’s real growth, and 26% of such growth in 2000. Id. at 25-26. During
2001, “as employment dropped by 1.4 percent in the total private sector,
employment gained 0.5 % in telecom services and 1.4 % in computer software
and services.” Price & McKittrick, supra note 11, at 4-5. As of 2003, the most
recent year in which a report was published, “IT producing industries became
once again an important ingredient in an overall U.S. economic expansion.”
David Henry & Donald Dalton, Information Technology Producing
Industries—Hopeful Signs in 2003, in DIGITAL ECON. 2003 9, 9 (U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce 2003), available at https://www.esa.doc.gov/2003.cfm (follow Digital
Economy 2003 Chapter 1 hyperlink). Similarly, as of 2002, seven of the ten
fastest growing occupations were projected to be in the information technology
industry. Sandra D. Cooke, Jobs in the New Economy, in DIGITAL ECON. 2002
41,
48
(U.S.
Dep’t
of
Commerce
2002),
available
at
https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf . Meanwhile, in late 2002,
Silicon Valley began to recover from the technology bust of 2000-2001. Jim
Hopkins, Hints of recovery in Silicon Valley, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2002, at 3B.
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industry, information technology producers still contributed
disproportionately to the United States’ economic growth and
continued to grow at double digit rates. 15 Most people consider
familiarity with computers an essential element of the ability
to achieve future economic success. 16 This section briefly
reviews the historical legal debate surrounding three key sets
of technology policy issues from the last ten years. In each set
of issues, judges and regulators have been asking themselves
whether technology regulation is “special.” In other words,
judges have been forced to confront the question of whether
current regulatory paradigms can expand to successfully
address technological innovation.
This question remains
unresolved for each set of issues, questioning the success of
current regulatory paradigms.
A new set of regulatory
paradigms may be needed, one that is able to evolve alongside
and simultaneously with the technology interactions it governs.
A. DO TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS REQUIRE SPECIAL RULES?
Perhaps the earliest case law and legal theory discussions
of appropriate paradigms for technology regulation occurred in
the context of technology contracting. 17 Technology, both as

Studies indicate, however, that increasing numbers of workers are not able to
acquire access to the technological resources needed to ensure productivity in
a progressively digitized world economy.
See Luc Soete, ICT’s and
Employment: The Problem of Job Quality, 140 INT’L LABOUR REV. 143, 156
(2001). The impact of information and communications technologies on jobs is
not yet known and no outcome is inevitable. See id. at 160. Technology-driven
changes in organizational structures, employment relations, worker
autonomy, and work organization will not automatically result in higher job
quality. See id. at 154-57. In 2000, 800,000 technology jobs were estimated to
have gone unfilled because of a dearth of qualified workers. Microsoft Corp.,
Valuing
Diversity,
http://www.microsoft.com/issues/essays/2000/1115diversity.mspx (Published Nov. 15, 2000). This resulted in an estimated
opportunity cost of $4 billion per year. Id. Although numbers from 2000 may
reflect inflated employment resulting from the technology “bubble,” the
“[g]rowth in demand for high quality digital products and electronically
delivered services is expected to fuel the demand for skilled IT workers in the
future.” Cooke, supra, at 59.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL SERVICES & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DIVISION INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY UNIT, CHANCELLOR’S
OFFICE, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES, TECHNOLOGY II STRATEGIC PLAN
2000-2005
1
(2000),
available
at
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/26
/03/80.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991) (deciding the issue of what constituted the agreed use of the technology).
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the subject matter of agreements 18 as well as the technological
means of contract formation, 19 presented challenges to
Similarly, technology
traditional contracting paradigms. 20
exacerbated preexisting doctrinal tensions in contract law with
regard to, for example, the tension between the efficiency of
form contracting and the desire for personalized assent in
contracts. 21
As the subject matter of transactions, new technology
raised questions regarding whether separate default rules
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should be required
for software transactions. 22 Proponents of revisions to the UCC
argue that software presents a different context from a
standard goods transaction and calls for new rules. 23 Those
opposed argued that previous rules could grow to encompass
changes in types of goods and that attempting to craft
technology-specific rules would result in a limited approach
that would be outgrown. 24 Ultimately, the UCC Article 2
18. I am referring to debates over agreements such as software and
digital content licensing agreements, software and website development
agreements, and online services agreements such as hosting agreements. For
a discussion of issues in software licenses, see, e.g., Robert Gomulkiewicz,
Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Marketing Licensing for Software,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004).
19. I am referring to debates over enforceability of, for example,
clickwrapped agreements versus browsewrapped agreements such as terms of
use. For a discussion of terms of use, see, e.g., Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91
MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006).
20. Specht v. Netscape, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Assent may be registered by a signature, a
handshake, or a click of a computer mouse transmitted across the invisible
ether of the Internet.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-53 (7th
Cir. 1996) (in which the use of software was at issue). For a discussion and
analysis of the above and other cases dealing with contracts and software use,
see Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475 (2002).
21. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451-53 (pointing out the regularity
of purchasing software before agreeing to the terms of use and discussing
when a contract is formed).
22. See, e.g., Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for
Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
277, 298 (2005). Today the digital contracting landscape has been further
complicated by the software industry’s shift from an off-the-shelf software
model to a services-focused model which includes both code and support. Id.
at 299.
23. Lorin Brennan, Understanding the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Why Article 2
Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 534-45 (2000).
24. Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability
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revision was considered impractical by many and it did not
Whether there should be
gain widespread acceptance. 25
default rules in technology transactions remains unresolved,
particularly with regard to default contracting rules for using,
sharing and creating open source code. 26
In the context of legislating rules for technology mediated
contract formation, federal 27 and state 28 digital signature
in Cases of Sufficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269, 277 (1999).
25. The revisions were not approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Compare NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMPUTER
INFORMATION
TRANSACTION
ACT
(2002),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UCITA_amds_AM02.pdf , with NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMPUTER
INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS
ACT
(2002),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.pdf. For a discussion of the
proposed revisions to UCC Article 2 addressing software transactions, see
Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The
Neverending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999);
Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305 (1994); and Richard E. Speidel,
Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607
(2001).
26. Because of the unique, nonhierarchical method of development
presented by open source code, the agreements frequently present a different
set of restrictions on code use See Agin & Kumis, supra note 22, at 329-30.
For a discussion of the challenges facing open source contracts, see, for
example, Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Software
Hackers: MySQL and its Dual Licensing, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 203
(2004); Andrés Guadamuz González, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in
Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321 (2006); Stephen M. Maurer et al.,
Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 6 MINN. J. L.
SCI. & TECH. 169 (2004); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source
Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (2001); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of
Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary
Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333 (2006); Greg R.
Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 563 (2004); and Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software:
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004).
27. For a discussion of electronic signature legislation, see, for example,
Juan Andres Avellan V., John Hancock in Borderless Cyberspace: The CrossJurisdictional Validity of Electronic Signatures and Certificates in Recent
Legislation Texts, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 301 (1998); Anthony M. Balloon, From
Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract Formation, and a New
Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905
(2001); Carl Carl, et al., Are Online Business Transactions Executed by
Electronic Signatures Legally Binding?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2001);
Lance C. Ching, Electronic Signatures: A Comparison of American and
European Legislation, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 199 (2001-2002);
David E. Ewan, et al. It’s the Message, Not the Medium!, Electronic Record and
Electronic Signature Rules Preserve Existing Focus of the Law on Content, Not
Medium of Recorded Land Title Instruments, 60 BUS. LAW. 1487 (2005);
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legislation established parity for real space and virtual space
technology mediated signatures. This legislative statement
came
relatively
early
in
the
mainstreaming
and
commercialization of the Internet, arriving before users and
businesses understood how to fully leverage it. Although
financial services companies, particularly brokerage houses,
were early adopters of digital signatures, many other
companies were sometimes slow to incorporate digital
contracting into their procedures. 29 Consequently, digital

Susanna Frederick Fischer, Saving Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in a Virtual
World? A Comparative Look at Recent Global Electronic Signature Legislation,
7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 229 (2001); Gregory Todd Jones, Electronic
Signatures and Records: Permit the Use of Electronic Signatures and Records
Even When a Statute, Regulation or Other Rule of Law Specifies a NonElectronic Type of Signature or Record, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 6 (2001); Robert
Gilbert Johnston, Digital Signature and Electronic Document Verification, 17
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 721 (1999); R.R. Jueneman & R.J.
Robertson, Jr., Biometrics and Digital Signatures in Electronic Commerce, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 427 (1998); Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Practice,
6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 148 (2006); Marianne Menna, From Jamestown to the
Silicon Valley, Pioneering a Lawless Frontier: The Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH 12 (2001); Sarah E.
Roland, Note, The Uniform Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act: Removing Barriers to E-Commerce or Just Replacing Them
with Privacy and Security Issues?, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2001); Thomas
J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving with Change: Electronic Signature
Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 723 (1999); Jared Sommer, Electronic Signatures and
the UETA: E-Commerce in an Insecure E-World, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 507 (2001);
Jonathan E. Stern, The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 391 (2001); Ashoke S. Talukdar,
Electronic Signatures in E-Heathcare: The Need for a Federal Standard, 18
J.L. & HEALTH 95 (2003-04); Mike Watson, Comment, E-Commerce and ELaw; Is Everything E-Okay? Analysis of the Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 803 (2001); Jane K. Winn,
The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures and
Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353 (2001).
28. For a discussion of state level digital signature statutes, see, for
example, Robin C. Capehart & Mark A. Starcher, “Wired Wonderful West
Virginia” – Electronic Signatures in the Mountain State, 104 W. VA. L. REV.
303 (2002); Allison W. Freedman, The Electronic Signatures Act: Preempting
State Law by Legislating Contradictory Technology Standards, 2001 UTAH L.
REV. 807 (2001); Andrew D. Stewart, Navigating the E-Sign Nebula: Federal
Recognition of Electronic Signatures and Impact on State Law, 24 U. HAW. L.
REV. 309 (2001); William E. Wyrough, Jr. & Ron Klein, The Electronic
Signature Act of 1996: Breaking Down Barriers to Widespread Electronic
Commerce in Florida, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407 (1997).
29. See e.g., FTC and DOC on Digital Signatures Legislation,
http://lists.essential.org/random-bits/msg00194.html (last visited Apr. 11,
2007).
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signature legislation’s full potential perhaps remains
unrealized.
Corollary questions also pertain to the logistics of online
payment mechanisms in digitally executed contracts.
Regulators have not adopted a clear position regarding whether
Internet mediated payment methods require the extension of
real space default rules for financial transactions and consumer
protections. For example, the FDIC stated in an advisory letter
that it does not consider PayPal to be a bank. However, various
state regulators have begun to question whether PayPal is
operating an unauthorized money transmitting service, or
illegal banking service. 30 Scholars are at odds on this point as
well, debating whether consumer protection necessitates
extending the penumbra of real space banking law to
cyberspace. 31
Finally, tensions persist in the age-old form contracting
debates over efficiency through adhesion contracts versus
fairness through customization and negotiability. 32
The
technology context is beginning to disrupt the existing
imperfect peace. In particular, end user license agreements
(which authorize conduct many technologists consider
unethical) 33 now challenge legal lines. For example, digital
rights management software which comes bundled with other
products engages in conduct that would constitute computer
intrusion were it not for consent granted during installation
through ostensible acceptance of a form contract. 34 The clash
of traditional intellectual property law paradigms with
technology contracts presents unresolved questions about
whether technology is special, as demonstrated in the dramatic
differences in contracting norms between open source and
proprietary software licenses. 35
30. See Troy Wolverton, Feds: PayPal not a bank, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar.
12, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-858264.html.
31. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment
Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681, 702-15 (2004).
32. For a discussion of the tradeoffs between standardization and
customization, see, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Online
Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1125 (2002).
33. For a discussion of overreaching in digital rights management
software and license agreements, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
Technoconsen(t)sus, __WASH.UL.REV.__ ( 2007)
34. Id.
35. For examples of open source license agreements see, e.g., Nelson,
Open Source, Open Source Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/licenses
(submitted Sept. 2006). For a discussion of Internet contracting, see, for
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B. ARE TECHNOLOGY HARMS NOVEL AND DO THEY NEED
SPECIAL REDRESS?
Court and scholars have also struggled with the question of
whether technology mediated harms are qualitatively and
quantitatively different from real-space harms. In other words,
the question was whether these harms warranted special
redress, and, if yes, how should any such damages be
calculated. Specifically, harms relating to speech, dignitary
harms, child protection, and intangible property damage vexed
judges and scholars.
Because of the novelty and increased anonymity of the
Internet, free speech became emboldened in virtual space.
Predictably, claims arose out of this emboldened speech. 36
Corporate claims arose relating to alleged harms from various
forms of Internet speech—postings or emails of disgruntled or
overzealous corporate insiders 37 or outside pump-and-dump
fraudsters posting information to financial bulletin boards 38 or
other Internet forums. 39
For consumers, Internet communications raised questions
of dignitary harms, unwanted access to personal property, such
as intrusion into their hard drives, and unwanted use of
personally identifiable information.
Internet defamation
claims arose. Spam began as merely annoying speech usurping
resources but now may be imposing financial harms onto

example, Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 975 (2005); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds,
Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Internet Contracting Cases 2004-2005, 61
BUS. LAW. 433 (2005).
36. For a discussion of anonymity on the Internet, see, for example, David
L. Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge
to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000); Thomas F. Cotter &
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech
(Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 06-37, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=925736.
37. For a discussion of corporate insider technology harms, see Elizabeth
A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005).
38. See, e.g., Ian Ballon, Jonathan Eisenberg, Poison Pen: Chat Board
Liars May Be Vulberable to Lawsuits, 754 PLI/PAT 163 (2003).
39. For a discussion of Internet pump and dump schemes, see David B.
Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It Should Be: Liability Under §10(B) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10B-5 Thereunder for Making False and Misleading
Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 243 (2005).
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recipients in new ways. 40 Similarly, forms of spyware, 41 may
currently involve conduct closer to computer intrusion 42 than
digital speech. 43 Finally, new types of dignitary harms may
arise from digital divides in our society. 44 Courts generally
41. For a discussion of the dangers of spam and the shortcomings of
regulatory efforts, see, for example, Peter B. Maggs, Abusive Advertising on
the Internet (SPAM) Under United States Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 385 (2006);
Beth Simone Noveck, Public Participation in Electronic Rulemaking:
Electronic Democracy or Notice-and-Spam?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall
2004, at 7; and Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective:
Spam as an International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 370 (2006), available
at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/matwyshyn.asp.
41.For a discussion of the dangers of spam and the shortcomings of regulatory
efforts, see, for example, Peter B. Maggs, Abusive Advertising on the Internet
(SPAM) Under United States Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 385 (2006); Beth
Simone Noveck, Public Participation in Electronic Rulemaking: Electronic
Democracy or Notice-and-Spam?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2004, at 7; and
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an
International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 370 (2006), available at
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/matwyshyn.asp.
42. For a discussion of computer intrusion and exceeding authorized
access, see Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
43. See generally Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE
J. ON REG. 77 (2003); Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial Speech on the Internet:
Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 293-97
(1998).
44. Digital divides refer to unequal access to technology that fall along
socio-economic and demographic lines; they can be divided into two categories
– access divides and production divides. For a discussion of access divides see,
e.g., EDUCATION WEEK, TECHNOLOGY COUNTS 2001: THE NEW DIVIDES (May
2001), available at http://counts.edweek.org/sreports/tc01/; Andrew G. Celli,
Jr. & Kenneth M. Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the Digital
Divide, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (2002) (arguing that three separate
digital divides exist: technology access, capital access, and treatment
differences among different consumers in pricing and purchase terms);
Patricia F. First & Yolanda Y. Hart, Access to Cyberspace: The New Issue in
Educational Justice, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 385 (2002) (arguing that existing civil
rights laws are applicable to unequal Internet access for identifiable groups);
Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2002); William E. Kennard, Equality in the Information
Age, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 553 (1999) (arguing that the digital divide is defined
by both unequal access to technology and by unequal access to ownership
opportunities of broadcast companies); Donald R. Tetreault, Technology
Equity: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 66 SCH. BUS. AFFS., Aug. 2001, at
28 (arguing that effectively measuring “technology equity” is critical to
determining if it has been achieved); Int’l Roundtable, The Lifelong Learning,
New Techs. Gap: Reaching the Disadvantaged, The Lifelong Learning and
New Technologies Gap (Dec. 10, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.literacyonline.org/products/ili/pdf/IP0001.pdf. For a discussion of
production divides, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: Information
Technology Equity, the Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information
Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35 (2003).
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have not provided recourse for unequal access, 45 though the
Americans with Disabilities Act may be expanded in the near
future to require website accessibility for the disabled. 46 Thus,
no consensus exists as to whether harms resulting from
technology are unique and warrant different regulatory
paradigms.
Technology easily and obviously also exacerbated real
space harms in the area of child protection. Several statutory
attempts to protect children from online predators, unsuitable
content and data mining have been made. 47 However, the
approaches have not alleviated the problems faced in this area,
and courts have not always been willing to enforce the
statutes. 48 Filters and other proactive technological means,
rather, are commonly advocated as being more effective than
reactive legal measures. 49 Legal scholars diverge as to whether
technology focused statutes are the optimal means for
minimizing and redressing these harms. 50
45. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co, 385 F.3d 1324 (2004)
(holding the ADA does not extend to the Internet because the Internet is not a
place of public accomodation). See a discussion of the digital divide in America
Online Latino v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 02 Civ.4796 LAK, 2002 WL
31663568 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2002).
46. See Declan McCullagh, Judge: Disabilities Act doesn’t cover Web,
NEWS.COM,
Oct.
21,
2002,
CNET
http://news.com.com/Judge+Disabilities+Act+doesnt+cover+Web/2100-1023_3962761.html (reporting that a federal judge ruled that Southwest Airlines does
not have to make its web site more accessible to the blind). But see, e.g., Nat’l
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation, Case 3:06-cv-01802-MHP
Document 62 Filed 09/06/2006, N.D. Cal.(2006); OUT-LAW News, Target
Lawsuit Tests Limits of US Web Accessibility Law, Dec. 9, 2006,
http://www.out-law.com/page-7285.
47. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–06 (2000); Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000); Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000);
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2006).
48. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Association., Inc., 539 U.S.
194, 200-01 (2003), rev’g 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
49. For a discussion of filters, see United States v. American Library
Association., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2003), rev’g 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
50. For a discussion of technology and child protection, see, for example,
William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 397 (2003); Jared Chrislip, Filtering the Internet Like a Smokestack: How
the Children’s Internet Protection Act Suggests a New Internet Regulation
Analogy, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 261 (2005); Dannielle Cisneros, “Virtual Child”
Pornography on the Internet: A “Virtual” Victim?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
19; Cathleen A. Cleaver, Cyberchaos vs. Ordered Liberty: Protecting Children
from Pornography on the Internet, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61 (1997); Mehagen
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Scholars and judges have considered redress for technology
harms through speech restrictions, intellectual property
statutes, computer intrusion statutes and the trespass to
doctrine. Yet, the unwillingness of courts to
chattels 51
robustly calculate damages in cases of digital harm 52 and the
Doyle, Bad Apples in Cyberspace: The Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of
Children over the Internet, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 119 (1999); F. Barrett
Faulkner, Applying Old Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests of
Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27
(2003); Rick Gallagher, Downward Departures: Curing the Lenient Sentencing
of Internet Child Pornographers and Statutory Rapists, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L.
& POL’Y 111 (2000); Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over
the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from Pornography
on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141 (2003); Steven
D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children’s Internet Protection
Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries,
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025 (2002); Adam Horowitz, The Constitutionality of the
Children’s Internet Protection Act, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425 (2000); Eric
Hwang, Child Pornography on the Internet, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 7
(2002); Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right?
A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible
Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 721 (2004); Susan S. Kreston, Computer Search
and Seizure Issues in Internet Crimes against Children Cases, 30 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 327 (2004); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Childproofing the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 447 (2003); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive
Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1999); Madeleine Mercedes
Plasencia, Internet Sexual Predators: Protecting Children in the Global
Community, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 15 (2000); Audrey Rogers, Playing
Hide and Seek: How to Protect Virtual Pornographers and Actual Children on
the Internet, 50 VILL. L. REV. 87 (2005); Cortney Scott, The Children’s Internet
Protection Act: Filtering Freedom or Protecting Young Minds?, 2003 UCLA J.L.
& TECH. NOTES 28 (2003); Felix Wu, United States v. American Library Ass’n:
The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional
Roles, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555 (2004).
51. For a discussion of Internet trespass, see Michael R. Siebecker,
Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on our
Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003).
52. For a discussion of calculating damages in technology intrusion
contexts, see George Roach & William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper
Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2006).
For example, in the context of intentional violations where an individual
exceeds authorized access to a computer or network, no statutory damages are
available under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2000). In addition, the approach used to assess damages varies from court to
court. Under section 1030(g) of the CFAA, a private right of action is available
for any victim who suffers “damage or loss” due to a violation of the CFAA.
Damage, as defined under § 1030(e)(8) of the statute, requires either (A) losses
aggregating $5,000 during any 1-year period to one or more individuals; (B)
impairment to medical diagnosis or treatment; (C) physical injury to any
person; or (D) a threat to public health or safety. Many plaintiffs have
encountered problems meeting the $5,000 threshold for damages. Two schools
of thought exist regarding the proper interpretation of the CFAA damage
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hesitation to expand civil doctrines such as trespass to chattels
into technology contexts calls into question the judiciary’s
commitment to providing legal redress for harms from digital
speech. This judicial reluctance may have in part catalyzed the
dramatic increases in intangible property harms such as
identity theft 53 and trade secret theft 54 of the last ten years.
C. IS THE INTERNET A SEPARATE LEGAL SPACE NEEDING SPECIAL
LEGAL RULES?
The final great theoretical debate in technology legal
theory revolves around equivalency of virtual and physical
geography—should the Internet be legally characterized as a
separate space or merely as an extension of physical space for
requirements in § 1030(g) for “damage or loss.” While “damage” is defined and
requires a plaintiff to meet a threshold of $5,000, the term “loss” is not
adequately defined in a fashion that allows courts to meaningfully and
consistently interpret the statute. Courts have also differed as to whether
damages to multiple plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit can be aggregated in
order to meet the $5,000 threshold and the extent to which loss of goodwill can
be included in calculations. But under the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, minimum statutory damages are indicated on the basis of an escalating
series of violations; minimum damages start at $50, and quickly rise to
$10,000. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000). However, a debate exists in the courts
whether courts have the discretion not to award any damages in some cases.
See, e.g., Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825, 827 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that courts have discretion); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428, 434 (8th Cir.
1996) (same); Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1995) (same). But
see Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 714-16 (1st Cir. 1999)
(suggesting in dicta that courts must award damages); Rogers v. Wood, 910
F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts must award a minimum of
$10,000 in statutory damages per violation), reh’g denied, 914 F.2d 260 (1990);
Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp. 283, 285 (D. Puerto Rico 1993) (holding
that courts must award damages).
53. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Class action suit over ID
theft
tossed
out,
Oct.
12,
2006,
http://news.com.com/Class+action+suit+over+ID+theft+tossed+out/21007348_3-6125028.html.
54. For a discussion of trade secret theft and technology related damages
see, e.g., Rowe, supra note 37. For a discussion of intangible corporate assets
generated through technology, see Estelle Derclaye, An Economic Analysis of
the Contractual Protection of Databases, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247
(2005). Scholarly opinions on redress for technology–mediated intellectual
property harms and privacy harms have been ample on both sides of these
arguments. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, Did
Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (2003); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 89 (2001); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003).
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regulatory purposes? 55 In other words, is technology best
characterized as a limitation on or an extension of social
control, sovereignty, and autonomy legal frameworks that exist
in real space. This debate over this legal characterization of
virtual space began at the time the first browsers came into
existence. 56 A clear divergence of opinion existed in the
scholarly community over both the legitimacy of the Internet as
a separate space and the legitimacy of Internet regulation as a
separate field of legal study. 57
This theoretical debate has its practical incarnation in the
case law of Internet jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments.
The lines of geographic sovereignty became ambiguous as far
away courts sometimes granted litigants general 58 or personal
jurisdiction over residents of other states based on Internet
Internationally, foreign courts and regulatory
contacts. 59
55. For a discussion of the debate, see generally Jack L. Goldsmith,
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1199-1200 (1998); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); and Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 709 (1998).
See also Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?, 114 HARV. L. REV.
606, 618 (2000).
56. Mosaic was developed in 1993 by two University of Illinois graduate
students, Marc Andersen and Eric Bina. JOHN CASSIDY, DOT CON 51 (2002).
Immediately following the launch of Mosaic, use of the World Wide Web
increased. See id.
57. Compare, Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996), with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
58. General jurisdiction refers to the situation where a court asserts
jurisdiction over a defendant whose continuous activities in the forum are
unrelated to the cause of action sued upon but the defendant’s contacts are
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to make the state’s assertion of
jurisdiction reasonable See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with
General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 137-39 (2001) (arguing that
the concept of general jurisdiction is fatally flawed, particularly in the context
of the Internet, but should not be abandoned).
59. For a discussion of various possible approaches to Internet
jurisdiction, see, for example, Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There?
Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1345 (2001); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network
Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 493 (2004); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme
for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001); Martin H. Redish, Of New
Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the Nature of
Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 609 (1998); Allan R. Stein,
Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 373; Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, 32 INT’L LAW, 1167 (1998); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing
Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (2001).
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bodies adjudicate matters with foreign defendants engaging in
technology-mediated
international
conduct.
Foreign
defendants refuse to appear or to assert lack of jurisdiction
even in the face of default judgments, 60 exposing the limits of
international judgment reciprocity.
Similarly,
technology
complicated
tax
nexus
determinations; questions of tax nexus required determining
whether the Internet was a separate transactional space or
whether territorial tax paradigms applied. In particular,
practical difficulties arose in determining whether adequate
contacts existed for purposes of nexus between certain Internet
goods and services and a certain jurisdiction. For example, one
vexing tax question pertains to whether and where software,
especially downloaded software, should be taxed. Should it be
taxed at the point of residence on a server or at the place of
ultimate download by a user? Similarly, taxation of webbased
software services present unresolved legal questions that turn
on where in physical space the Internet services are
“performed”. 61
D. LACK OF RESOLUTION IN LEGAL PARADIGMS MAY LEAD TO
BREAKDOWNS OF USER TRUST
To date, none of these sets of legal questions have been
conclusively resolved by either courts or legislatures.
Technology businesses and users continue to exist in a state of
regulatory uncertainty. As a result, one of the most serious
threats to the future of technology-mediated commerce is a
breakdown of user trust in technology. 62
60. See, e.g., Joris Evers, Spam fighter hit with $11.7 million judgment,
NEWS.COM,
Sept.
14,
2006,
CNET
http://news.com.com/Spam+fighter+hit+with+11.7+million+judgment/21007350_3-6116009.html (noting that defendant UK-based Spamhaus “didn’t
mount a defense in the case; the ruling was a default judgment in absence of
counterarguments”).
61. For a discussion of the technology and tax nexus, see, for example,
Walter J. Baudier, Internet Sales Taxes From Borders to Amazon: How Long
Before All Your Purchases Are Taxed?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2006);
Eric A. Ess, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation? States Seek
Solution to Stop e-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfalls, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 893
(2006); Pamela Swidler, The Beginning of the End to a Tax-Free Internet:
Developing an E-Commerce Clause, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 541 (2006). For a
discussion of the difficulties in crafting a functional international regime for
coordinated taxation of Internet purchases, see, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An
International Tex Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L.REV. (2003).
62. For a discussion of trust and the Internet, see Tamar Frankel,
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Trust arises through predictability and certainty in
transactions and recourse. 63 However, as demonstrated by the
preceding discussion, courts, legislators, and scholars have not
reached consensus on any of the three major sets of technology
regulation questions debated in the last decade. This lack of
consensus suggests that it is necessary to re-examine the
underlying regulatory assumptions regarding humans’
relationship with technology. Perhaps the regulatory focus
should move away from regulating the technology itself and
move toward regulating the ways humans interact with
technology tools. A focus on proactively guiding human
development of users rather than a focus on reactively
restricting particular technologies may hold more promise.
Legislative approaches are usually compartmentalized around
either restricting a particular technology or resolving a
particular legal issue. Rarely is a technology user’s perception
or development presented as a focus of the overall regulatory
picture.
Technology regulation frequently presumes that users are
a one-dimensional, linear, and stagnant piece of the regulatory
picture. This assumption is based in early developmental
psychology theory. However, this approach is not informed by
later bodies of human development theory which view humans
and their development as inherently dynamic and
multidimensional.
This flawed assumption about the linear nature of human
development may be part of the reason for the inability to craft
successful regulatory and judicial approaches to technologymediated exchanges. Legislators and judges should seek to
create a new regulatory picture that supports the dynamic
levels of complexity that users experience in technology
mediated exchange. The new regulatory focus becomes users’
development. 64 Nonlinear developmental theory contemplates
Trusting and Non-trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457 (2001).
63. Id.
64. Complexity here refers to complexity theory, the idea that systems
exist where a large number of similar but independent actors who persistently
move, respond, and evolve in relation to each other in an increasingly
sophisticated manner. For a discussion of complexity theory, see, for example,
David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”:
Toward a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-making in Complex Systems,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998). See also, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas &
Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in
a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003); Susan W. Brenner,
Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1 (2004); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a
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this set of emergent interactions and may prove instructive for
beginning to craft new dynamic regulatory paradigms.
II. NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSTRUCTING COMMERCIAL
IDENTITY
Human development theory or developmental psychology
theory can be divided into linear and nonlinear developmental
theory. 65 Linear developmental theory presumes that all
humans develop in a similar fashion, demonstrating an upward
developmental trajectory that is tied to chronological age.
Nonlinear developmental theory adopts the opposite approach.
It asserts that chronological age cannot necessarily be tied to
assumptions about development because development is an
inherently social process that occurs in a particular real-world
context. 66 Consequently, a linear approach to technology
regulation presumes a homogeneity in the consumer population
regarding individuals’ sophistication and comfort level with
technology based on their chronological age. Chronologically
older individuals should demonstrate more proficiency than
those of chronologically younger age. 67 A nonlinear approach
would not make these assumptions. Linear developmental
psychology is reflected in the work of theorist Jean Piaget, 68
while nonlinear developmental psychology theory is perhaps
best reflected in the work of Lev Vygotsky, 69 Urie
Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Susan P. Crawford,
The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603
(2003); Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1017 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:
Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145
(2003); Scott H. Hughes, Understanding Conflict in a Postmodern World, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red
Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91
GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004).
65. For an overview of developmental psychology theory, see PATRICIA H.
MILLER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (W.H. Freeman and
Company 1993) (1983).
66. JAMES V. WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND
(1985).
67. Id.
68. For a discussion of Piaget’s work, see, for example J. FLAVELL, THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JEAN PIAGET (1967).
69. For a discussion of Vygotsky’s work, see, for example, ALEX KOZULIN,
VYGOTSKY’S PSYCHOLOGY: A BIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS (1990); FRED NEWMAN &
LOUIS HOLZMAN, LEV VYGOTSKY: REVOLUTIONARY SCIENTIST (1993); THE
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Albert Bandura, 71 and Erik Erikson. 72

A. LINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
Linear developmental psychology theory, as demonstrated
by the work of Jean Piaget, creates an age-contingent, lock-step
Piaget divided
trajectory for human development. 73
development into four periods with distinct stages therein, and
named these periods of development the sensorimotor period,
the preoperational period, the concrete operational period, and
the formal operational period. 74 The sensorimotor stage lasts
from birth to age two and is characterized by a child moving
from simple reflexes to organized behaviors that are oriented
toward interacting with the external world through goal
oriented exploration behaviors and object permanence 75
skills. 76 The preoperational period, which spans age two until
age seven, follows, and during this period one develops semiotic
function—the ability to use symbols. 77 Differentiation of other
people from the self is incomplete, however, even though one is
VYGOTSKY READER (Rene Van der Veer & Jaan Valsiner, eds., 1994); RENE
VAN DER VEER & JAAN VALSINER, UNDERSTANDING VYGOTSKY. A QUEST FOR
SYNTHESIS (1991); NIKOLAI VERESOV, UNDISCOVERED VYGOTSKY: ETUDES ON
THE PRE-HISTORY OF CULTURAL-HISTORICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1999); JAMES V.
WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND (1985).
70. For a discussion of Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work, see Susan S. Lang,
Urie Bronfenbrenner, Father of Head Start Program and Pre-eminent ‘Human
Ecologist,’
Dies
at
age
88,
Sept.
26,
2005,
http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept05/Bronfenbrenner.ssl.html.
71. For a discussion of Albert Bandura’s work, see Barry J. Zimmerman &
Dale H. Schunk, Albert Bandura: The Scholar and His Contributions to
Educational Psychology, in EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CENTURY OF
CONTRIBUTIONS 431-54 (Barry J. Zimmerman & Dale H. Schunk eds., 2003).
72. For a discussion of Erik Erikson’s work, see ERIK ERIKSON, THE ERIK
ERIKSON READER (Robert Coles, ed., 2001).
73. Linear developmental theories presume a lock-step approach to
development that has only recently started to fall out of favor. See, e.g.,
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD, 4 (A. James & A. Prout eds.,
1997).
74. MILLER, supra note 65, at 42.
75. Object permanence refers to the knowledge that an object exists even
if not in line of sight. See, e.g., Economic and Social Research Council,
R000238995 - Object Permanence and A not B Errors: What They Tell Us
About
Infant
Development,
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Plain_English_Summaries
/social_stability_exclusion/social_exclusion/index321.aspx?ComponentId=9839
&SourcePageId=11719 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
76. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 43-51.
77. See id. at 51-56.
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able to interpret the world in terms of the self in a loosely
logical manner. 78 The concrete period comes next, and lasts
between ages seven and eleven. 79 The concrete period is
marked by the ability to perform logical mental operations,
which are internalized and can be reversed. 80 Finally, the
formal operational period from age eleven to age fifteen is a
time characterized by abstract thinking where mental
operations are not necessarily tied to concrete objects. 81 At this
point in a linear developmental paradigm adulthood arrives
and development stops. 82 Therefore, adulthood signals the
highest level of development in a linear paradigm, when full
development is “achieved.” 83
B. NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL AND IDENTITY THEORY
Other developmental theorists have developed nonlinear
approaches that hold important contrary insights to the views
of Piaget and other linear developmental theorists. 84 Unlike
the lockstep approach of linear theorists, nonlinear theorists
take a dynamic approach. An individual interacts with and
within a particular social context to generate development in
an emergent manner.
Lev Vygotsky, the founder of contextualist developmental
theory and a contemporary of Piaget, introduced the
importance of analyzing development in a cultural context. 85
The smallest unit of analysis for Vygotsky is the child in a
particular social context, an inherently variable construction
Learning and
across environments and individuals. 86
78. Id. at 53-54.
79. See id. at 56.
80. See id. at 56-59.
81. See id. at 60-62.
82. Piaget’s model of cognitive development ends with the acquisition of
formal operational intelligence during teen years. For a discussion of various
linear developmental paradigms see, e.g., ADULT DEVELOPMENT: VOLUME I:
COMPARISONS AND APPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS (Michael L.
Commons et. al, eds., 1987).
83. See PIAGET, REFLECTING ABSTRACTION, supra note 3; see generally
MILLER, supra note 65.
84. The works of Lev Vygotsky, Urie Bronfenbrenner, Albert Bandura and
Erik Erikson provide important insights into the way development and
identity are inherently dialectical and interactionist joint constructions.
85. See LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (Alex Kozulin, ed. &
trans., 1986).
86. LEV VYGOTSKY, MIND AND SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER
MENTAL PROCESSES,86-90 (1978).
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development occurs on the person-society border through an
individual interacting inside the “zone of proximal
development”. 87 The zone of proximal development refers to
the gap between the actual developmental level of the child at
the time and the higher level of the child’s potential
development with help from adults or more advanced peers. 88
Help in development comes not only from humans in the
environment but also from self-help using cultural tools such as
computers. 89 For Vygotsky, humans master themselves from
the outside through psychological and technical tools, which
allow individuals to achieve more in their specific context. 90
These tools, however, also vary depending on culture and social
contexts. 91 In other words, the focus of assessment using a
Vygotskian developmental paradigm is less on the static notion
of who the child currently is and, rather, more on the dynamic
question of who the child can become, depending on context and
tools.
An elaboration on the evolving, nonlinear nature of social
contexts that shape development can be found in the work of
Urie Bronfenbrenner. 92 Bronfenbrenner presents an ecological
model 93 that illustrates the importance of reviewing multiple
levels of social context. 94 Specifically, he identifies four levels
of analysis: (1) macrosystem; (2) mesosystem; (3) exosystem;
and (4) microsystem. 95 Analysis at the macrosystem level
requires examination of culture as a whole, along with belief

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979) [hereinafter
BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY]; URIE BRONFENBRENNER, INFLUENCES ON
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1975); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, INFLUENCING HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (1973); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, ON MAKING HUMAN BEINGS
HUMAN (1981); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, TWO WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD (1973);
URIE BRONFENBRENNER, TWO WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD - US AND USSR (1975);
R. MYERS & URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE TWELVE WHO SURVIVE:
STRENGTHENING PROGRAMMES OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1992).
93. An ecological model is a model which conceptualizes a dynamic set of
interactions in a living system. For a discussion of ecological models, see, e.g.,
James Moore, Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, HARV. BUS.
REV., May/June 1993, at 75.
94. See BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY, supra note 92.
95. See id. at 7-8.

MATWYSHYN A. Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
2007;8(2):515-549.

536

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

systems and ideologies underlying cultural rules and norms. 96
In other words, the analysis focuses on the mechanisms of
social governance and the worldview prevalent in civil society.
Analysis at the mesosystem level focuses attention on
interpersonal dynamics and the dynamics between the
individual and secondary settings, such as the workplace. 97
Analysis at the exosystem level contemplates the interactions
outside of the primary sphere of analysis but which,
nevertheless, affect or are affected by what happens in the
At the microsystem level, analysis is
primary setting. 98
primarily focused on individuals and their psychological
development in a particular context. 99 The individual interacts
within and across all four levels and consequently develops
because of these interactions.
Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory presents a
consonant analysis. The theory views the interaction between
individuals and environments as a three way exchange in
which the person, an entity with unique characteristics,
performs a behavior in an environment which responds back to
the person and the behavior in a process of reciprocal
determinism; it is an idiosyncratic interaction. 100 According to
Bandura, models 101 can serve to instruct, motivate, disinhibit,
inhibit, socially facilitate, and arouse emotion in a process of
Essentially, development is a
vicarious reinforcement. 102
process of quantitative change, during which learning episodes
gradually accumulate over time. 103 Although Social Learning
Theory does not directly address historical or cultural context,
it reflects the tradition of Vygotsky and the contextualist
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 258.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 56.
See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY, 15 (1986); See also ALBERT BANDURA,
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, 200-208 (1977); ALBERT BANDURA & R.H.
WALTERS, ADOLESCENT AGGRESSION (1959); ALBERT BANDURA, AGGRESSION:
SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973); ALBERT BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969); PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELING: CONFLICTING
THEORIES (Albert Bandura ed., 1971); ALBERT BANDURA & R.H. WALTERS,
SOCIAL LEARNING AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1963); SELF-EFFICACY IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES (Albert Bandura ed., 1995); and ALBERT BANDURA,
SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997).
101. BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 100, at 40-50.
102. See id. at 117–19.
103. Id.
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approach. It recognizes the dialectical process of development
where individuals work within and are shaped by an
environment; a triadic reciprocal determinism occurs among
behavior, cognitive factors and the environment. 104 Also, as in
the theory of Vygotsky, there is no endpoint to development,
Thus, children are
and universal behaviors are rare. 105
developmentally malleable but only within constraints of
biology and environment.
Finally,
Erikson
frames
development
through
identification of eight stages/dichotomies of human
development and identity formation: (1) basic trust versus
mistrust; (2) autonomy versus shame; (3) initiative versus guilt;
(4) industry versus inferiority; (5) identity versus role
confusion; (6) intimacy versus isolation; (7) generativity versus
stagnation; and (8) ego integrity versus despair. 106 Erikson’s
first three stages represent early stages when the individual is
not yet capable of interacting with (borrowing a Vygotskian
phrase) “cultural tools” such as the Internet. 107 The eighth
stage is similarly a stage in which the individual is primarily
conquering internal dynamics, and, therefore, interaction with
culture, its tools, and other individuals is not the primary focus
of the stage. 108 Conversely, in the intermediate stages, the
individual is learning from and making a place in society. 109
The child becomes a different person in each stage with
different cognitive capacities and progressively achieves a
greater ability to interact with a wider range of people. 110 For
Erikson, the ego can only remain strong through interactions
with cultural institutions that enable the development of the
child’s capacities and potential. 111 As in all nonlinear theory,
Erikson’s stages are not bound to chronological age.
These four schools of nonlinear developmental theory offer
useful analytical lenses for (re)theorizing and assessing
technology regulation.

104. See id. at 194–96.
105. Because self-beliefs play a key role in development, trajectories are
inherently varies. For a discussion of the role of and variations of self-beliefs
in development see, e.g., ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: TOWARD A
UNIFYING THEORY OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE (1977).
106. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (1950).
107. See generally id. at 247-58.
108. See id. at 268.
109. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (1950).
110. See id. at 258–59.
111. See generally id. at 190–204.
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C. LESSONS FROM NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY FOR
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCE
Nonlinear developmental theory offers five concrete lessons
for crafting successful technology regulation. First, nonlinear
developmental theory instructs us that human development
and learning is always situated; the zone of proximal
development varies across individuals. Second, development is
an emergent 112 phenomenon. Third, learning and development
do not always cleanly map on to chronological age. Fourth,
regulating the way that humans interact with technology
means contemplating multiple layers of context that cooperate
or conflict to generate development. Finally, technology is
merely a tool that assists humans in achieving more than they
otherwise could; the regulatory and developmental focus should
always remain human-centric. 113
Nonlinear developmental theory reminds us of the
importance of regulatory context or the situated learning of the
individuals whose conduct the law tries to govern.
Development is not something that happens to humans in a
preordained manner; rather development is an interactive
process that occurs on the person/society border. Therefore, the
society a person experiences pushes the course of his or her
development and vice versa. Learning and development of both
children and adults occurs at different paces across different
individuals, contingent in each case upon social context in the
Vygotskian “zone of proximal development”. 114 Therefore, the
variations within the context of development must be
considered when crafting regulatory paradigms. The same
biological individual in two different social contexts will arrive
at two different developmental outcomes.
A successful
regulatory paradigm will consider both.
Similarly, humans exist in a particular emergent social
context. The social context–including the technology itself—
changes in frequently unpredictable ways. Thus, regulating in
112. Emergence, generally, is order that arises from the interactions of
individual actors within a complex system, demonstrating a global pattern
that could not have been forecast simply from understanding the behavior of
one particular actor. See STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE (2001).
113. See supra notes 100-102.
114. See VYGOTSKY, supra note 85, at 187. For more on the zone of
proximal development, see generally RENÉ VAN DER VEER & JAAN VALSINER,
UNDERSTANDING VYGOTSKY: A QUEST FOR SYNTHESIS 336–43 (1991).
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a manner predicated on static assumptions about people and
technology results in law destined for quick obsolescence. Both
human behavior and technology will evolve in response to law.
Law must be capable of evolving as well.
Nonlinear developmental theory reveals that effects on
individuals’ development and behavior are emergent across
multiple layers of context. 115 As Bronfenbrenner’s ecological
model asserts, a human is inherently embedded in multiple
systemic layers that influence developmental outcomes and
behaviors. 116 It is through the convergence of these multiple
layers of influences that development and corresponding
behaviors arise. Thus, a law pushing on development in the
macrosystemic layer will influence an individual, but three
additional layers of influence coexist in the space. Multiple
developmental layers must coincide in pushing in the direction
sought by the regulation. The influence of the exosystem of
social norms, the mesosystem of peer groups and the economic
exchange, and the microsystem of the individual’s current state
of development all come into play. Viewing the lessons of the
model in the context of crafting effective regulation, without
considering the impact of regulation on each of these
interrelated layers, regulation can frequently be circumvented
or ignored, or it may impact behavior in unanticipated and
undesirable ways. 117
Development does not always map onto chronological age.
An adult user whose only interactions with a software
application occur once a week for an hour in a library on a
shared machine experiences technology development and
learning differently than does the ten year old child with a

116. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model is represented as a series of
concentric circles—or, as Bronfenbrenner characterized it, “like a set of
Russian dolls”—with the microsystem level in the innermost circle and
macrosystem in the outermost circle. See BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY, supra
note 92, at 3.
117. For example, the CAN-SPAM Act, a macrosystem rule which aimed to
regulate communication on the mesosystem level, lacked adequate
macrosystem and mesosystem enforcement mechanisms. No private right of
action was created by the law and agencies empowered to enforce it suffer
from limited resources. Spammers have recognized this lack of enforcement
and adapted to a behavior of either defiance of the law or feigned compliance.
This feigned compliance consists of spammers including an opt-out footer at
the bottom of emails that is not honored. Instead it is used as a method of
verifying that a user checks the email account. For a discussion of spammer
noncompliance with CAN SPAM see, e.g., Matwyshyn n.9 supra. See also, e.g.,
BRIAN S. MCWILLIAMS, SPAM KINGS (2004).
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laptop in her bedroom. Technology can both equalize abilities
and exacerbate differences.
The adult with illegible
handwriting is as easily understandable in email as the adult
with clear penmanship.
But, comfort with technology
frequently maps onto number of hours spent interacting with
computers—something driven by access to computing
resources, which is a function of financial resources. 118
New technologies should be analyzed merely as tools in a
Vygotskian sense. They enable a user to accomplish more than
the user ordinarily could without the tool. As such, the conduct
that arises from this assisted action is not new; it is merely
amplified conduct. As with any amplification, the waves of the
conduct reach further and more potently than if the conduct
had not been amplified. This broader reach necessitates a
different legislative approach. Regulating technology creation
is not the answer; regulating humans, their conduct, and use of
that technology is a more promising approach.
Finally, the broader identity development goals of the
individual provide context for the conduct of the individual. At
various stages of life, developmental progress intersects with
identity goals, creating another lens guiding individual
behavior and developmental outcomes. Because these identity
goals are inherently social in nature, two layers of context push
on the individual. First, the context shaping development
through interactions, and, second, the context in which the
individual attempts to work toward identity goals. 119 For
example, when resolving the Eriksonian conflict of
generativity 120 versus stagnation, an individual may seek to
generate something greater than herself by turning to
technology tools such as the Internet that have previously
influenced her development. Technology regulation is not (and
should not be) about regulating the creation of the technology
118. Several studies have demonstrated a correlation between time spent
using computers and positive attitudes toward technology. See, e.g., Traci L.
Anderson, Relationships Among Internet Attitudes, Internet Use, Romantic
Beliefs, and Perceptions of Online Romantic Relationships, 8 CYBERPSYCHOL.
& BEHAV. 521 (2005). Lacking access to technology, therefore, by itself creates
disadvantage.
119. See supra notes 117-18.
120. Generativity is the concern over accomplishing a lasting impact on
society through socially valuable work that guides the next generation of
humanity. For a discussion of generativity see, e.g., Dan P. McAdams, R.I.
Logan, What is generativity?, in THE GENERATIVE SOCIETY 15-31 (E. de St.
Aubin et. al., eds. 2004).
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itself. Rather, technology regulation should consider humans’
use of tools. .
These humans, perhaps unlike the technology itself, can
demonstrate extreme levels of variation; however, they provide
a more efficacious, though more complicated, point for
regulation. Because different environments generate different
developmental and learning experiences, humans’ experience
with technology varies.
For some humans, technologymediated contexts immediately cause consternation or
resignation in ways that wholly real space contexts do not. For
other humans, however, no palpable difference exists between
technology-mediated and real space interactions. For still a
third group of people, real space contexts are more likely to
cause discomfort than virtual ones. Technology is merely a
tool, and, like every tool, some people are better at wielding it
than others.
This multimodal distribution of technology
comfort and proficiency does not map chronological age, nor is
it absent among the regulators and judges crafting our
technology regulation paradigms.
Placing these five lessons in regulatory context, COPPA
demonstrates how ignoring these five lessons of contextualist
developmental theory can result in regulatory suboptimality.
III. CASE STUDY: CHILDREN’S DATA SECURITY
CONTRACTING AND THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT
The case study of COPPA, intended to safeguard
information about children that websites collect for commercial
leveraging, demonstrates the shortcomings of a legislative
approach driven by linear assumptions about development.
A. LEGAL HISTORY OF COPPA
The technology tool of the Internet has caused society to
reconceptualize the value of user data and, consequently, the
role that privacy and personal information control play within
Widespread Internet access has caused
our society. 121
consumers to start to reevaluate the importance of control over
their personal information and their children’s information. 122
Meanwhile, corporate entities have begun to place a premium
121. See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005).
122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 106–07 (1999) (noting that
“the privacy of data about personal financial information has become an
increasingly significant concern of consumers”).
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on consumer information, particularly in corporate
acquisitions. 123 As the technology boom hit in the late 1990’s
and the European Union worked on adopting the EU Data
Directive 124 in member states, Congress chose to address data
protection in a segmented fashion, starting with Internet child
data protection and COPPA. 125
COPPA became effective in April 2000. 126 COPPA requires
that websites targeting children under the age of thirteen
provide notice of privacy practices and obtain verifiable
parental consent prior to collecting data from the child. 127 The
statute also empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
promulgate additional regulations to require the operator of a
website subject to COPPA to establish and maintain reasonable
procedures “to protect the confidentiality, security, and
integrity of personal information collected from children.” 128
Additionally, commentary to the promulgated regulations
states the appropriate security measures for protecting
children’s data include, without limitation or proscription,
“using secure web servers and firewalls; deleting personal
information once it is no longer being used; limiting employee
123. For a discussion of the transformation of user data into a marketable
commodity, see Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000).
124. Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (E.C.).
125. Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 2000, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06
(2000); see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 CFR Part 312
(2006). For a discussion of COPPA, see, for example, Gaia Bernstein, When
New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy
Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2005); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material
Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security and Securities
Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129 (2005); Edward L. Palmer & Lisa Sofio,
Food and Beverage Marketing to Children in School, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33
(2006); Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a
Re-Imagination of Information Privacy, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127 (2006);
Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Educational Informational Privacy for Public
Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1158 (2006).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06; see also 16 C.F.R § 312.1 (2006). Commentators
have observed that COPPA was a reaction to the failure of self-regulation,
particularly subsequent to the Kids.com advisory letter where the FTC set
forth standards for privacy policies on websites targeting children. For a
discussion of the Kids.com FTC letter, see Parry Aftab, How COPPA Came
INFORMATIONWEEK,
Jan.
19,
2004,
About,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17300888.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(a)(i)–(ii) (2000).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2000).
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access to data and providing those employees with datahandling training; and carefully screening the third parties to
whom such information is disclosed.” 129 COPPA leaves much
discretion in data security to the individual website operator
and creates no external reporting mechanism to monitor
internal security improvements of website operators subject to
COPPA. 130
Specifically, COPPA stipulates that prior to collection of
data from a child under thirteen, a website “operator” 131 must
obtain “verifiable parental consent”. 132 The preferred medium
for this verifiable parental consent is receipt of a fax from the
parent. An email exception 133 was originally crafted as an
interim measure to be phased out over time. This email
exception evolved into a “sliding scale approach” which is still
applied by the FTC in COPPA inquiries. 134 Depending on the
character of the data collection and the intended use, the FTC’s
analysis varies. For example, the need to obtain verifiable
parental consent does not pertain equally to all child data
gathering; the situation where a website collects data for a one129. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,906
(Nov. 3 1999). Sadly, this articulation of the technology specifications is
suboptimal. For example, the implementing regulations instruct companies to
use “secure servers”, but servers cannot be inherently “secure” or “vulnerable.”
Securing a server is a process that is ongoing. Perhaps a better phraseology
would be to have required companies to take all steps identified by a leading
security research firm as the fundamental exercise of care in attempting to
secure a server on an ongoing basis.
130. Id. However, encryption was deemed to be potentially cost prohibitive
and left to the discretion of entities, as was the suggested use of contractual
provisions requiring minimum standards of data care from third parties
granted access to the collected children’s data.
131. Operator is broadly defined under the COPPA statute and
implementing regulations. They encompass anyone who meaningfully handles
children’s data. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (1998); see also Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2007).
132. Verifiable parental consent was ideally constructed as a process
involving e.g. faxing parental signatures to each website permitted to collect a
child’s data. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (1998); see also Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (2005). This process allows for easy
circumvention as no independent means of authenticating the parental
signature would exists.
133. Because of the cumbersome nature of the faxing, email verification of
parental consent was subsequently permitted. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(1998); see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5
(2005). Though this exception was originally intended to be phased out, it has
persisted. Email verification is susceptible to even easier child circumvention
than fax verification.
134. See BNA, FTC Decides to Retain COPPA Rule With No Change After
Review of Comments, 7 COMP. TECH. L. REP. 127 (2006).
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time use and does not permanently connect the child with the
information does not necessitate the same degree of consent
verifiability. 135 Additionally, a safe-harbor program exists
where third party certificate authorities can attest compliance
of websites with COPPA. 136 The FTC is empowered to institute
regulatory prosecutions against entities violating COPPA.
These prosecutions result in fines and consent decrees.
Amounts of fines have varied, with the most recent levied at
$1,000,000 against Xanga.com, a social networking website. 137
Prior prosecutions have been few in number, and previous fines
have not exceeded $500,000. 138
135. See 15 U.S.C. §6501-6506 (1998); Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2007). In particular, one of the COPPA exceptions
provides for one time collection, provided the information is subsequently
destroyed. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06; see also Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule, 16 CFR § 312. In practice, companies frequently learned how
to live within the exceptions to the extent possible to avoid compliance.
136. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiative: Safe Harbor
Program,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens_shp.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
137. See United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-CIV-682(SHS) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept.
7,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623073/xangaconsentdecree.pdf. On September
7, 2006, the FTC and Xanga.com settled the regulatory action. Xanga.com
acknowledged that it failed to notify parents and obtain consent before
collecting, using, and disclosing the information of users it knew to be under
thirteen. Despite the user agreement’s statement that children under thirteen
could not join, children could register using a birth date showing they were
younger than thirteen. After Xanga.com allegedly knew of their age-specific
registration, the company failed to put in place measures to prevent collection
of their personal information. Xanga.com also failed to notify the children’s
parents of the company’s information practices or provide parents with access
to and control over the information collected on their children. Id.
138. See United States v. Bonzi Software, Inc., No. CV-04-1048 RJK (W.D.
Cali.,
Feb.
18,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/bonzi/040217decreebonzi.pdf; United States v.
UMG Recordings, Inc., No. CV-04-1050 JFW (C.D.Cali., Feb. 18, 2003)
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/umgrecordings/040217cagumgrecordings.pdf;
United States v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4:03-CV-00350-JEJ (M.D.Pa. Feb.
27, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/hersheyconsent.htm;
United States v. Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-00205 (D.Utah
Feb.
27,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/mrsfieldsconsent.htm; United States v. The Ohio
Art Co., No. __________ (N.D.Ohio, Apr. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/ohioartconsent.htm; United States v. Pop Corn
Co. No. ___________ (N.D.Iowa, Feb. 14., 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/popcorncnsnt.pdf; United States v. Lisa Frank,
Inc., No. ______________ (E.D.Va., Oct. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/lfconsent.pdf; United States v. Looksmart, Ltd.,
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During the first six years of its effectiveness, COPPA has
received mixed reviews at best.
The deterrent effect of
prosecutions appears to have been limited. A large number of
websites which are governed by COPPA are simply
noncompliant and are willingly to risk prosecution rather than
investing effort in an attempt to comply with COPPA. As
demonstrated by several studies, compliance is generally under
60%, 139 and even websites that attempt compliance are
frequently easily circumvented in their age verification
process. 140
Businesses have complained that the cost of COPPA
compliance associated with monitoring usage, drafting privacy
policies, and obtaining proof of parental consent runs as much
as $200,000 per year by some estimates. 141 In some cases,
companies have deemed the costs of compliance prohibitive and
simply ceased operations. 142 For example, some websites
removed highly interactive elements from their sites shortly
after COPPA’s passage, alleging that compliance costs rendered
certain lines of business unsustainable. 143
COPPA protects the data of children who wish to have
their data protected. 144 For children who simply wish content
access, in many instances immediate workarounds are readily
available. Often the child merely needs to log in again and
No.
01-606-A
(E.D.Va.,
April
19,
2001),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/looksmartorder.pdf; United States v. Monarch
Servs., Inc., et al. No. AMD 01-CV-1165 (D.Md., April 19, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/girlslifeorder.pdf;
United
States
v.
Bigmailbox.Com, Inc., et al., No. 01-605-A (E.D.Va., April 19, 2001), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/bigmailboxorder.pdf.
139. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, THE ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE
UNIV. OF PA., PRIVACY POLICIES ON CHILDREN’S WEBSITES: DO THEY PLAY BY
THE RULES? (2001)., http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/PrivacyReport.pdf.
Two studies of COPPA compliance by the University of Pennsylvania’s
Annenburg Public Policy Center and by the Center for Media Education
reported that although most of the sites they reviewed had privacy policies
and limit the information collected from children, these privacy statements did
not include required disclosures and used language that was difficult to
understand. Id.
140. See, e.g., NetFamily News, Newsletter, Apr. 21, 2000, available at
http://www.netfamilynews.org/nl000421.html.
141. See Ben Charny, The Cost of COPPA: Kids’ Site Stops Talking,
ZDNET, Sep. 12, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-523848.html; Art
Wolinsky, WiredKids,
From Safety and Privacy to Literacy and
Empowerment,
Sep.,
2000,
http://www.infotoday.com/mmschools/sep00/wolinsky.htm
142. Charny, supra note 141; Wolinsky, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Net Family News, supra note 140.
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provide a false birth date to gain access to the material to
which they were denied access. 145
As such, the business-focused crafting of the statute
ignored the practical realities of child-technology and childparent interactions. COPPA adopted a clearly linear, static
view in addressing children’s activities online.
Its
shortcomings result in part from this paradigm
B. COPPA IS NOT GROUNDED IN A NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL
THEORY
As discussed previously, developmental psychology has
moved toward studying individuals in a social context instead
of focusing on decontextualized traits.
Fundamentally,
individuals eventually internalize the intellectual life of the
people around them, and humans create themselves and their
cognitive development through activity.
Looking to our
culture’s “tools”, primarily the Internet, which bridge the
physical and social world for the child, learning is always
situated and the zone of proximal development varies across
individuals. COPPA’s framework presents a static framework
that does not take into account these nonlinear insights.
First, COPPA presumes that parents are more
developmentally advanced than their children regarding
technology. COPPA is predicated on the idea that an adult
parent’s proficiency with technology surpasses that of her child,
an assumption research demonstrates is unsustainable. 146
Technology learning and development do not always cleanly
map on to chronological age. Parents frequently feel their
ability to monitor their children’s activities online is limited. 147
Second, the age of capacity to consent to data gathering
stipulated in COPPA, age thirteen, appears to have been
selected arbitrarily.
During early adolescence, large
divergences in development are visible, perhaps even more so
than in later life. Even assuming a linear paradigm, since the
issue at hand relates to data security contracting, a logical age
of consent might mirror contractual capacity generally.
Assuming the linear paradigm of contract law, the usual age of
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Parents shaky about kids’ safety online,
CNET
NEWS.COM,
Aug.
10,
2006,
available
at
http://news.com.com/Parents+shaky+about+kids+safety+online/2009-1025_36104028.html
147. Id.
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contractual capacity is eighteen.
Third, COPPA takes into account only one computing
context, the home, and presumes a parent is available during
the child’s Internet time. However, children frequently access
the Internet and give away information about themselves using
computers at school, at friends’ houses, in the home when
parents are not present, and in the library. Therefore, a
regulatory paradigm presuming parental presence does not
reflect the reality of children’s situated learning in multiple
contexts.
Fourth, both technology use and development are emergent
phenomena. COPPA did not take into account the norms of
corporate conduct that would arise to circumvent its
restrictions. Because COPPA grants no private rights of action
to parents, enforcement of COPPA is the sole province of the
FTC, which is an understaffed and overburdened agency. As
demonstrated by widespread noncompliance, companies
frequently run a risk-benefit calculus regarding the likelihood
of prosecution and decide to risk regulatory action rather than
invest in compliance structure.
Finally, COPPA presents a technology-focused regulatory
design; the focus is on each website that chooses to collect
children’s data.
As technology evolves, a website-centric
approach is destined for obsolescence. A more promising
regulatory design would be constructed in a human-centric
manner focusing on the child and the child’s information. Such
an approach would not only demonstrate greater versatility
and regulatory longevity, but systemic efficiencies would result
over the current system. In lieu of each website needing to
institute a separate age verification process for each child, and
each parent approving each website, a child-focused approach
could be constructed in such a manner to allow for a single
parental approval and a single website registration. In this
way, economies of scale could be created through a child data
protection structure focused on the child rather than on the
website operator. Such an approach would also acknowledge
that parents may be less knowledgeable and need more
protection than their children, sub-optimally suited for a role of
gatekeeper.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY COMMERCE
REGULATION: NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL
PARADIGMS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ECONOMIC
CYBORG
As the example of the COPPA illustrates, lessons of
nonlinear developmental psychology offer promising insights
for crafting future generations of technology regulation. The
evolutionary nature of nonlinear developmental paradigms
allow for the flexibility to regulate both an evolving technology
context and an emergent developmental context for consumers.
As consumers become more technology proficient, their use of
technology tools will change. Consequently, their development
and identity formation will follow a different path from prior
generations of consumers.
Turning to Erikson’s insights regarding identity
development, the dualities of industry versus inferiority,
identity versus role confusion, intimacy versus isolation, and
generativity versus stagnation will be resolved in new ways by
future generations. Successful regulation will be sensitive to
these human dynamics. The ability of individuals to work
effectively, find a place in society, connect with others and
create things outside themselves all play out through use of
technology tools. The future holds a world where progressively
more individuals’ work will involve technology creation and
use. In our post-information revolution economy, consumer
transactional behaviors are moving into technology-mediated
space. Growing numbers of people in the United States have
Internet access, 148 and online spending is increasing by
approximately 25% annually. 149 Consumer economic identity
is increasingly characterized by a hybrid real space-virtual
space set of economic and social behaviors; consumer spending
Meanwhile, digital
through e-commerce is growing. 150
entrepreneurship and content creation is on the rise. Growing
numbers of individuals are participating in technology148. See NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET:
TOWARD
DIGITAL
INCLUSION
(Oct.
2000),
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/contents00.html.
149. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Online shopping jumps 25 percent from
Dec.
14,
2006,
2005,
OCREGISTER.COM,
http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/money/article_1382582.php.
150. See Christopher Saunders, Consumer Confidence in Internet Grows, ESept.
30,
2002,
COMMERCE-GUIDE.COM,
http://ecommerce.Internet.com/news/news/article/0,,10375_1472681,00.html.
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mediated content creation. 151
A successful technology
regulatory regime will be sensitive to all of these emergent
dynamics. It will assist users in leveraging technology tools
toward guiding their own development and viewing themselves
as commercial cyborgs—technologically-empowered consumers
and citizens. This developmental evolution is critical to
building commercial trust in the future information technologymediated economy.

151. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION IS GOING
MAINSTREAM AND THAT MEANS USER-GENERATED CONTENT IS COMING FROM
ALL
KINDS
OF
INTERNET
USERS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf.

